Arabs: From the Amman Summit for Normalization with Assad to the Aqaba Summit for Post-Assad Management

Arab countries played a significant role in thwarting the popular uprisings that began in 2011. This article examines their role in Syria to assess and understand how to address it in a way that serves the interests of Syrians transitioning towards a pluralistic and democratic system while ensuring the interests and stability of Arab states.

First: The Amman Summit and Free Normalization with Assad’s Regime

On May 1, 2023, a meeting was held in Amman, including foreign ministers from the Syrian regime, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. The aim was to discuss Syria’s reintegration into the Arab League and address key regional issues such as combating drug smuggling and the return of Syrian refugees, while notably abandoning demands for political reform and the implementation of Resolution 2254. The attendees adopted the “step-by-step” approach, paving the way for Bashar al-Assad’s participation in the Arab League Summit in Jeddah on May 19, 2023. This was Assad’s first attendance at an Arab summit in over a decade, following Syria’s suspension from the League in 2011. The move marked a turning point in normalizing relations between Syria and Arab states.

Despite the concessions, Arab states did not achieve tangible gains. Drug smuggling operations and trafficking gangs continued targeting Arab countries, Syria’s security situation did not improve, and the presence of Iran-backed sectarian militias persisted. Notably, since the onset of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Arab states played a negative role by supporting rival factions, leading to internal conflicts among revolutionary forces. For example, in Eastern Ghouta, clashes erupted between Jaysh al-Islam, backed by one Gulf state, and Faylaq al-Rahman, supported by another. This occurred amidst the U.S. and European withdrawal and Gulf nations competing for influence in Syria, alongside a broader Gulf crisis starting with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain recalling their ambassadors from Qatar in March 2014, culminating in Qatar’s blockade in June 2017.

Impact of Normalization with Assad on the Opposition

The unconditional Arab normalization with Assad’s regime was disappointing for Syrians. However, it inadvertently led to positive changes. With Arab states halting their support for armed factions and focusing on normalization, revolutionary forces in Idlib consolidated, enabling better organization and decision-making. This ultimately contributed to military successes that led to the regime’s downfall on December 8, 2024.

Impact of Normalization on the Regime

Normalization emboldened the regime, which, despite losing control of a third of Syria, refused to engage in serious negotiations or make political concessions. This fueled public anger and reignited protests. As the economic collapse continued and living conditions deteriorated, regions like Suwayda witnessed large-scale protests from 2023, with discontent even surfacing in traditionally pro-regime areas. In the end, Arab states’ alignment with the regime shifted the burden onto revolutionary factions, which became more independent and hastened the regime’s fall.

Second: The Aqaba Summit and Post-Assad Management

The Aqaba Summit convened on December 14, 2024, in Aqaba, Jordan, with the participation of Arab and Western foreign ministers and officials following Assad’s fall. The stated goal was to facilitate a peaceful transition in Syria per Resolution 2254 by supporting a political transition process, forming a government representing all Syrian factions, coordinating regionally to ensure Syria’s stability and prevent chaos, and providing urgent humanitarian aid.

This summit continued Arab efforts to control the political process to serve their interests, fearing the rise of democratic or Islamic political movements that might threaten their regimes’ stability. The Arab states’ role today mirrors their past, requiring a balanced approach to achieve mutual interests. Naturally, states act to protect their interests through all possible means.

Some Arab countries played a significant role in fragmenting revolutionary forces through funding and buying loyalties, a strategy they used in similar crises in Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and even Tunisia. This policy aims to weaken revolutionary projects that could serve as successful models threatening existing regimes.

Arab states also fear the rise of transnational Islamist movements and the domino effect it might trigger. Victory over Assad could inspire other peoples and topple additional leaders, prompting these states to favor regimes resembling their own in substance, even if they differ in form.

The Key Question: Can HTS Address Arab Concerns?

Although Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forms the backbone of Syrian forces, it represents only 30% of the military forces on the ground. Other forces include the Syrian National Army, remnants of the Fifth Corps (Southern Liberation Front), Kurdish forces, Suwayda forces, Free Syrian Forces, and other factions allied with Jolani. Given the ever-changing alliances, internal splits remain possible.

HTS itself is not cohesive, consisting of multiple wings:

• The conservative traditional wing.

• The local jihadist wing.

• The global jihadist wing with al-Qaeda ties.

This diversity weakens Jolani’s maneuvering capacity within HTS, limiting its ability to present a governance model acceptable regionally and internationally. This inherent weakness is compounded by Syria’s nearly collapsed economic, social, and administrative infrastructure.

Vision for Addressing Challenges

To overcome current obstacles, it is essential to:

• Present a clear vision for Syria’s future, focused on building a modern, pluralistic state governed by the rule of law and citizenship, serving as a stabilizing force in the region.

• Prevent indiscriminate funding and enforce strict oversight to avoid repeating the scenario of purchasing loyalties and causing divisions.

• Avoid exclusion, as marginalized parties will align with others, repeating Libya’s Haftar-like dynamics.

• Ensure fair representation for all parties and factions to achieve national consensus.

• Establish national priorities and rebuild military and security institutions while collecting arms.

• Provide regional and international guarantees to reassure Arab states and the global community about Syria’s future through a practical, politically acceptable model.

Conclusion

Reuniting Syrian revolutionary forces requires a realistic approach to regional and international challenges while accounting for Syria’s limited resources. Building a new Syria demands serious efforts to convince local, regional, and global stakeholders that the future Syria will be a nation of law, pluralism, and stability. These efforts will not only alleviate Syrian suffering but also contribute to lifting international sanctions and recovering frozen assets, supporting reconstruction efforts.